本書從純粹的數(shù)學和經濟學角度，針對不同的無線協(xié)作通信場景，著重圍繞系統(tǒng)模型、最優(yōu)契約設計和協(xié)作激勵策略等方面，通過建立包括選擇模型、道德風險模型、混合激勵模型、動態(tài)契約模型等多個契約模型，詳細闡述契約理論在無線協(xié)作通信和網(wǎng)絡應用中所涉及到的建模和契約優(yōu)化的細節(jié)。
隨著無線通信和網(wǎng)絡研究人員對網(wǎng)絡經濟問題的關注，許多經濟學理論在無線通信領域得以廣泛應用，如博弈論、拍賣理論、定價策略等。契約理論分別在2014年和2016年獲得諾貝爾經濟學獎，其在解決非對稱網(wǎng)絡信息方面的優(yōu)勢，逐漸被引入到無線通信和網(wǎng)絡等領域。趙楠著的《契約理論在無線協(xié)作通信網(wǎng)絡中的應用（英文版）》從純粹的數(shù)學和經濟學角度，針對不同的無線協(xié)作通信場景，著重圍繞系統(tǒng)模型、*契約設計和協(xié)作激勵策略等方面，通過建立包括逆向選擇模型、道德風險模型、混合激勵模型、動態(tài)契約模型等多個契約模型，詳細闡述契約理論在無線協(xié)作通信和網(wǎng)絡應用中所涉及到的建模和契約優(yōu)化的細節(jié)�！镀跫s理論在無線協(xié)作通信網(wǎng)絡中的應用（英文版）》可供從事無線通信和網(wǎng)絡等領域專業(yè)技術人員和研究人員參考使用，特別是研究激勵機制和定價策略設計、資源共享、資源交易等研究人員。
Chapter 1 Introduction
1．1 Wireless Cooperative Networks
1．2 Book Scope and Contributions．．
1．3 Book Organization
Chapter 2 Contract Theory
2．1 Basic Contract Concepts
2．2 Adverse Selection
2．3 Moral Hazard
2．4 Summary
Chapter 3 Cooperative Communication in Cognitive Radio Networks under Asymmetric Information
3．1 Introduction
3．2 System Model and Problem Formulation
3．2．1 Source Modeling
3．2．2 Relay Node Modeling
3．2．3 Contract Formulation
3．3 Optimal Contract Design under Symmetric Information
3．4 Optimal Contract Design Under Asymmetric Information
3．4．1 Feasibility Conditions for Optimal Contract Design
3．4．2 Optimal Contract Design
3．5 Results and Discussion
3．5．1 Symmetric Information Scenario
3．5．2 Asymmetric Information Scenario
3．5．3 Symmetric Information and Asymmetric Information Scenarios
3．6 Summary
Chapter 4 A Contract-Based Model For Multiuser Cooperative Relay In Wireless Communication Networks
4．1 Introduction
4．2 System Model
4．2．1 Source Modeling
4．2．2 Relay Node Modeling
4．2．3 Contract Formulation
4．3 Optimal Contract Design with Single Source
4．3． 1 Problem Formulation
4．3．2 Iterative Algorithm
4．4 Optimal Contract Design with Multiple Sources
4．4．1 Problem Formulation
4．4．2 Iterative Algorithm
4．5 Results and Discussions
4．5．1 Single Source's Relay incentive
4．5．2 Multiple Sources' Relay incentive
4．5．3 Convergence Analysis of Iterative Algorithm
4．6 RNs' Power Constraint Effect
4．7 Summary
Chapter 5 Optimal Contract Design for Cooperative Relay Incentive Mechanism Under Moral Hazard
5．l Introduction
5．2 System Model
5．2．1 Source Modelling
5．2．2 Relay Node Modelling
5．2．3 Contract Formulation
5．3 Optimal Contract Design under Symmetric Information Scenario
5．4 Optimal Contract Design under Asymmetric Information Scenario
5．5 Results and Discussions
5．5．1 Symmetric Information Scenario
5．5．2 Asymmetric Information Scenario
5．6 Summary
Chapter 6 Contract-based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsourcing Networks
6．1 Introduction
6．2 System Model and Problem Formulation
6．2．1 Utility of Mobile Users
6．2．2 Utility of Service Provider
6．2．3 Contract Formulation
6．3 Optimal Contract Design under Asymmetric Information Scenario
6．4 Analysis and Discussion
6．5 Numerical Results
6．6 Summary
Chapter 7 Contract Design for Relay Incentive Mechanism Under Dual Asymmetric Information In Cooperative Networks
7．1 Introduction
7．2 System Model and Problem Formulation
7．2．1 Source Modelingz
7．2．2 Relay Node Modeling
7．2．3 Contract Formulation
7．3 Optimal Contract Design under Symmetric Information Scenario
7．4 Optimal Contract Design under Single Asymmetric Information Scenario
7．5 Optimal Contract Design under Dual Asymmetric Information Scenario
7．5．1 Feasibility Conditions for Optimal Contract Design
7．5．2 Optimal Contract Design
7．6 Results and Discussions
7．6．1 Symmetric Information Scenario
7．6．2 Single Asymmetric Information Scenario
7．6．3 Dual Asymmetric Information Scenario
7．7 Optimal contract design with the RNs' continuous types
7．8 Summary
Chapter 8 Monitoring Strategy for Relay Incentive Mechanism in Cooperative Communications Networks
8．1 Introduction
8．2 System Model and Problem Formulation
8．2．1 Relay Nodes Modeling
8．2．2 Source Node Modeling with Non-Monitoring Strategy
8．2．3 Source Node Modeling with Monitoring Strategy
8．2．4 Contract Formulation
8．3 Optimal Contract Design with Non-Monitoring Strategy
8．4 Optimal Contract Design with Information-Monitoring Strategy
8．4．1 Stage III： RNs' behaviors
8．4．2 Stage II： MN's decision
8．4．3 Stage I： Source's decision
8．5 Optimal Contract Design with Action-Monitoring Strategy
8．5．1 Stage II： MN's Decision
8．5．2 Stage I： Source's Decision
8．6 Results and Discussions
8．7 Impact of RNs' Relay Effort Constraint
8．8 Summary
Chapter 9 Dynamic Contract Design for Cooperative Wireless Networks
9．1 Introduction
9．2 System Model and Problem Formulation
9．2．1 Relay Node Model
9．2．2 Source Model
9．2．3 Contract Formulation
9．3 Dynamic Contract Design under Asymmetric Information Scenario
9．3．1 Contracting Design in Period 2
9．3．2 Contracting Design in Period 1
9．3．3 Optimal Contract Design
9．4 Simulation Results and Discussion
9．5 Summary
Chapter 10 Conclusion and Future Works
10．1 Conclusion
10．2 Future works
References
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