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　　商務(wù)和法律教育的目標(biāo)不僅要使學(xué)生系統(tǒng)掌握理論和規(guī)則，還應(yīng)培養(yǎng)學(xué)生的思辨能力，使其能夠?qū)⑻囟ǖ囊?guī)則與相應(yīng)的生活實(shí)踐聯(lián)系起來，并進(jìn)而運(yùn)用規(guī)則去解釋和處理現(xiàn)實(shí)生活和工作中的問題。因此，高等院校的專業(yè)教學(xué)應(yīng)該以學(xué)生為中心，使教師的“教”和學(xué)生的“學(xué)”相結(jié)合，調(diào)動(dòng)學(xué)生的積極性，才能較好地實(shí)現(xiàn)教學(xué)目的。案例教學(xué)側(cè)重于實(shí)踐教學(xué)，從素質(zhì)教育和培養(yǎng)學(xué)生創(chuàng)造能力的角度，對(duì)激發(fā)學(xué)生專業(yè)學(xué)習(xí)興趣、培養(yǎng)學(xué)生專業(yè)素質(zhì)、提高學(xué)生在實(shí)踐中探究學(xué)習(xí)方法的自覺性、有效地將理論知識(shí)轉(zhuǎn)化為專業(yè)技能等多方面都能發(fā)揮重要作用。
　　《最新國際商法英文案例選編/全國高等院校雙語案例教程系列教材》適用于各高校的商學(xué)院、法學(xué)院以及其他學(xué)院的國際商務(wù)專業(yè)及商務(wù)英語專業(yè)的教學(xué)，主要為全英教學(xué)或雙語教學(xué)的商務(wù)類或法律類課程，提供具有參考價(jià)值的、國內(nèi)外有影響力的國際商法案例。既可幫助學(xué)生加深對(duì)國際商法基本概念、實(shí)踐操作的理解，同時(shí)也為教師在教學(xué)中選擇案例、組織討論提供便利。
　　與其他同類案例教材相比，本書在編寫過程中貫徹了如下特點(diǎn)：
　　1.《最新國際商法英文案例選編/全國高等院校雙語案例教程系列教材》并非以某一本特定的商務(wù)或法律英文原版教材的編寫結(jié)構(gòu)為順序來編寫案例，而是按一般商法教材的編寫結(jié)構(gòu)，涉及國際商法的幾大領(lǐng)域，如公司法、合同法、銷售法、代理法、票據(jù)法、WTO法、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法、電子商務(wù)法。這樣有助于各所高校選擇不同英文原版教材的教師在教學(xué)過程中按不同主題選擇案例。
　　2.《最新國際商法英文案例選編/全國高等院校雙語案例教程系列教材》在案例的選擇上經(jīng)過仔細(xì)篩選，兼顧其影響力和時(shí)效性。案例多選擇美、英、中、澳等經(jīng)濟(jì)大國的案例，多選擇具有重大影響力甚至是里程碑意義的案例，并納入不少2000年后國內(nèi)外的新近案例。
　　3.《最新國際商法英文案例選編/全國高等院校雙語案例教程系列教材》在編排結(jié)構(gòu)上注重有針對(duì)性的引導(dǎo)學(xué)生思考，并非是英文案例的簡(jiǎn)單堆積。
　　在每一章節(jié)開篇設(shè)置導(dǎo)讀部分“Introduction”，對(duì)本章節(jié)內(nèi)容進(jìn)行提綱挈領(lǐng)的介紹，以最基本的法理和知識(shí)要點(diǎn)為主，兼顧整體性，方便學(xué)生復(fù)習(xí)或預(yù)習(xí)該主題。

　　《最新國際商法英文案例選編/全國高等院校雙語案例教程系列教材》：
　　To allow a corporate riduciary to take advantage of a business opportunity when the fiduciary deternunes the corporation to be unable to availitself of it would create the worst sort of temptation for the fiduciary to rationalize an inaccurate and self-serving assessment of the corporation's financial ability and thereby compromise the duty of loyalty to the corporation. If a corporate riduciary's duty of loyalty conflicts with his personalinterest, the latter must give way. Unless a corporation is technically or de facto insolvent, a determination whether a business opportunity is corporate or personal does not depend on the corporation's relative rinancial ability to undertake the opportunity. To avoid liability for usurping a corporate opportunity on the basis that the corporation was insolvent, the fiduciary must prove insolvency.
　　The appropriate method to determine whether or not a corporate opportunity exists is to let the corporation decide at the time the opportunity is presented. If a fiduciary is uncertain whether a given opportunity is corporate or not, or whether the corporation has the frnancial ability to pursue it, he needs merely to disclose the existence of the opportunity to the directors and let them decide, Disclosure is a fundamental fiduciary duty. It cannot be burdensome, and it resolves the issue for all parties concerned and eliminates the necessity for a judicial determination after the fact.
　　In the present case, defendants do not contend that Berlinair was technically or defactoinsolvent. Although the company has run a deficit since commencing operations in 1977 and periodic infusions of capital have been required, that state of affairs does not constitute technical or de facto insolvency unless there is an imminent threat to the business' continued vitality Plaintiff offered expert testimony that Berlinair could have obtained adequate financing to secure the BFR contract. Defendants' expert witness, Beyer, an airline management expert, expressed the opposite opinion. However, there is nothing in his testimony or otherwise in the record to suggest that Berlinair was insolvent or was no longer a viable corporate entity. We conclude that ABC usurped a corporate opportunity belonging to Berlinair when, acting through Lundgren, the BFR contract was diverted. Accordingly, the constructive trust, injunction, duty to account and other relief granted by the trial court are appropriate remedies.
　　We turn now to plaintiff's cross-appeal. He brought a personal claim against Lundgren for breaches of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff sought actual and punitive damages. The actual damages issue was tried by the court. A jury was empanelled to try the punitive damages issue and found against Lundgren, but the court never made an award of actual damages.
　　The court granted the motion to dismiss and set aside the jury verdict for the reason that punitive damages are not available in equity. Pedah Company v Hunt, 265 Or 433,509 P2d 1197（1973）, had held that a court of equity cannot award punitive damages incident to the granting of injunctive relief. The stated reason for the rule was that an award of punitive damages by a court sitting in equity without a jury was believed to compromise a court's ability to do justice between the litigants. However, in Rexnord, Inc. v Ferris, 294 Or 392,657 P2d 673（1983）, after the trialin this case, the court held that a court may award both punitive damages and equitable relief in a single action if the plaintiff pleads and proves a claim which factually would permit an award of punitive damages.
　　We must rirst determine, therefore, whether plaintiff's individual action against Lundgren for breach of fiduciary duty is the sort of claim that permits an award of punitive damages. Noting that punitive damages are not favored in the law, we nevertheless conclude that a breach of fiduciary duty can be sufriciently reprehensible to justify submitting punitive damages to a jury. In the present case, suffice it to say, Lundgren's course of conduct in secretly diverting the BFR contract to his own company, ABC, was certainly sufriciently aggravated to create a jury question as to whether punitive damages should be awarded.
　　Plaintiff's indual claim against Lundgren sought both actual and punitive damages. Why the court made no award of actual damages does not appear in the record. In Oregon an award of punitive damages is not proper unless there is also an award of actual damages. Although we are not aware of any case that has ever explained the rationale for the rule, we are bound by it. Because punitive damages cannot be awarded when actual damages are not, the grant of defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against Lundgren was correct.
　　We are perplexed by the trial judge's sua sponte entry of a judgment not in favor of Lundgren on the punitive damages issue. We agree with plaintiff that entry of the judgment not in the absence of a motion by defendant is precluded by the plain language of ORCP 63. However, entry of the judgment now, based as it apparently was on the properly granted motion to dismiss, was harmless error.
　　Affirmed.
　　……

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