Preface
1　Introduction：On　the　Nature　of　the Literal.Metaphorical　Distinction
2　Metaphor　in　Cognitive　Linguistics
2.1　The　cognitive　linguistics　revolution
2.2　Experientialism　and　conceptual　organization
2.3　Reasons　to　take　experientialism　seriously
2.4　Cognitive　semantics　and　the　literal.metaphorical　distinction
2.5　Some　problems　for　the　philosophy　of　experientialism
2.6　Adjectival　polysemy　in　the　experientialist　framework
3　The‘Hot’Polysemy
3.1　Why　neurophysiology　matters　to　semantics
3.2　The　capsaicin　receptor
3.3　Are　hot　peppers‘hot’for　everyone?
3.4　The　pain　pathway
3.5　The　standard　assumption　and　the‘hot’polysemy
4　Across　Sensory　Modalities
4.1　Bright　sounds　and　loud　lights
4.2　Seeing　sounds　and　tasting　shapes
4.3　How　different　are　synaesthetes　and　non.synaesthetes?
4.4　Cross.modal　associations　and　synaesthetic　metaphors
4.5　Synaesthetic　adjectives　and　the　standard　assumption
4.6　The　no.polysemy　view　of　conceptual　structure
4.7　How　could　have　psychologically　primitive　concepts　come　abolJt?
5　Double.Function　Terms
5.1　Apuzzle
5.2　Asch　on　double.function　adjectives
5.3　Discussing　Asch’S　research：cross.linguistic　studv
5.4　Conceptual　atomism
5.5　Discussing　Asch’S　research：language　acquisition　study
6　Double.Function　Terms　Again
6.1　Adjectival　polysemy　in　psycholinguistic　research
6.2　Discussing　Williams　results
6.3　The　processing　of　alternative　meanings　by　cerebral hemispheres：the　beginnings
6.4　The　processing　of　alternative　meanings　by　cerebral hemispheres：later　studies
7　Words　and　Concepts
8　Back　to　Cognitive　Semantics
8.1　Sweetsers　mind.as.body　metaphor
8.2　Enter　criticisms
9　Polysemy　in　Lexical　Semantics
9.1　Semantics　and　conceptual　structure：the　beginnings
9.2　Polysemy　and　conceptual　structure
9.3　The　generative　lexicon
9.4　The　disquotational　lexicon　and　the　problem　of　polysen
10　The　No.Polysemy　View：What　It　Is　and　What　It　Is　N
10.1　The　one　literal　meaning　assumption
10.2　The　no.polysemy　view
10.3　Words，meanings，concepts，and　more
10.4　Metaphors　forever
11 A　Very　Short　Conclusion
Notes
References
Index